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1. Introduction
All over the world, declining population growth rates and rising life
expectancy are creating problems for public retirement systems. With a
constant population structure, a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security
system could operate at constant tax and replacement rates. But when the
ratio of retirees to workers rises, either tax rates must be raised or the
replacement rate must be reduced. These demographic changes are the driving
force for the current social security reform debate.
This paper considers the design of social security from an ex ante
perspective. Once a demographic shock is realized, a debate on how to
adjust taxes and benefits is necessarily a distributional debate. A lighter
burden on one generation implies a heavier burden on other generations.
From an ex ante perspective, in contrast, demographics is a stochastic
process and the design questions are about risk sharing. Different
realizations of birth rates and survival rates have an impact on the
financial status of government programs and, more broadly, on the set of
feasible allocations of national resources. Policy questions are then
questions of efficiency rather than redistribution: How can the financial
risks created by demographic uncertainty be shared by different
generations? What are the risk-sharing implications of alternative policy
rules? Moreover, we can evaluate specific policy actions (“reforms”) taken
in response to demographic changes in terms of whether or not they
represent efficient responses to the underlying shocks.
I examine demographic changes in a Diamond (1965) style neoclassical
growth model with overlapping generations, building on Bohn (1998a).
Government policy is potentially welfare improving because future
generations are naturally excluded from financial markets. They cannot
1insure themselves against macroeconomic or demographic risks.1 In this
setting, I characterize the general properties of alternative social
security systems, with a focus on four specific alternatives: A PAYGO
social security systems with defined benefits (DB), a PAYGO system with
defined contributions (DC), a private/privatized system, and a
“conditionally prefunded” system.
The two PAYGO systems are relevant because existing social security
systems in many developed countries are pure PAYGO systems, including the
U.S. until 1983. If the worker-retiree ratio is constant, DB and DC are
observationally equivalent. But when the retiree-worker ratio rises, the
key issue for PAYGO social security is if taxes are held constant and
benefits are reduced or if benefits are held constant and taxes are
increased. This choice is at the heart of the current U.S. policy debate.
The analysis of a privatized system is motivated by the current
discussion about systems in which individuals fund their own retirement, at
least in part. A fully privatized system represents this policy option in
pure form.2
Finally, the “conditionally prefunded” social security system is
intended to capture key features of the post-1983 U.S. system. The U.S.
social security debate is heavily influenced by the Social Security
Administration’s 75-year extrapolations of current policy. Whenever the 75-
year forecast shows a significant revenue gap, public pressure seems to
arise to reform the system.3 If one takes this linkage seriously and
1 To simplify, I abstract from private risk sharing and from Ricardian bequests.
2 Some of the privatization literature distinguishes between private savings without
government intervention and “privatized” social security, meaning a funded system that is
mandatory and government-regulated. For the intergenerational issues in this paper, this
distinction is irrelevant.
3 For example, the 1983 reform was supposed to cover the then-existing revenue gap through
tax increases that would accumulate a trust fund sufficient to carry social security
through the years of baby boom retirement. Much of the current debate is also about
closing the projected funding gap.
2assumes that projected funding gaps systematically trigger tax and benefit
changes, one obtains a well-defined pattern of intergenerational transfers,
namely a system in which trust funds are accumulated or drawn down in
response to demographic shocks. For the stylized representation of such a
system, I assume that net benefits are fixed one generational period in
advance, at a level that depends negatively on anticipated changes in the
retiree-worker ratio.4
The paper derives four main sets of results, namely about the
implications of variable birth rates, about variations in longevity, about
the different positive effects of alternative policies, and about their
efficiency properties.
First, members of a small cohort generally benefit from being in a
small cohort even if the government operates a DB social security system.
This finding deserves emphasis because the main concern in the current
reform debate has been about the plight of the baby bust generation, about
the fact that DB imposes relative high taxes on small cohorts that support
preceding larger cohorts. Large cohorts are, however, worse off than small
ones if there is no DB social security: Their high labor supply drives down
the wage rate when the cohort is young. Their desire to save reduces the
return on capital as they age. Conversely, small cohorts enjoy favorable
factor price movements. They are better off than large cohorts even with a
DB social security system unless taxes are so high that the fiscal burden
dominates the factor price effects.
4 There is an apparent consensus that benefit changes ought to be phased in slowly and
that the benefits of current retirees are untouchable. The reform debate is about varying
FUTURE benefit levels in response to anticipated demographic pressures, not about moving
to a true PAYGO-DC system with variable benefits to current retirees. McHale (1999)
suggests that social security reforms in other countries follow a similar pattern.
3In the model, the magnitude of the factor price effects relative to
the fiscal burden depends on the elasticity of factor substitution and on
the level of social security taxes. With Cobb-Douglas technology (as
benchmark), the factor price effects dominate if the ratio of tax rate (q)
to one minus the tax rate, q/(1-q), is below the capital share in output.
For the U.S., this condition is satisfied by a wide margin, suggesting that
the factor price effects of birth rate changes should dominate the fiscal
effects. The current debate about social security reform, in contrast,
focuses on fiscal pressures and virtually ignores factor price effects.5
One may wonder, of course, to what extent the results from the two-
period model are empirically realistic. The empirical evidence is
unfortunately very limited, largely because it takes decades of data to
obtain a single generation-length observation. Empirical evidence in
related areas--cross country growth and studies of relative wages--
suggests, however, that demographic changes have wage effects broadly
consistent with the OG model (see Section 6).
The second set of results is about unexpected changes in old-age
mortality. The implications for the allocation of risk depend significantly
on the individual predictability of death, on the availability of fair
annuities, and on who might receive any accidental bequests. Under a
variety of assumptions, lower old-age mortality increases the need for
retirement consumption. The efficient response to a longer retirement
period is then to increase social security benefits. This argument applies,
5 The Social Security Administration’s long run projections of the social security
system’s financial status are, for example, based on extrapolating historical trends.
Neither the linkage between cohort size and factor prices nor the insurance role of DB
social security are new ideas. Easterlin (1987) provides much broader arguments about the
advantages of being in a small cohort. Smith (1982) provides a numerical example
illustrating the insurance role of DB social security. The point here is that the factor
price effects are large relative to the fiscal effects under empirically plausible
assumptions and therefore important for social security reform.
4if deaths are individually foreseeable or if savings are annuitized, so
that accidental bequests are small, or if accidental bequests are
distributed within a cohort. Reduced benefits might be efficient, however,
if lower old-age mortality reduces the accidental bequests received by
workers.6
Third, a comparison of alternative policies shows that a fully
privatized system has essentially the same risk-sharing properties as a
defined-contribution PAYGO system. This is because neither a DC-PAYGO nor a
privatized system impose higher taxes on the young when the worker retiree-
worker ratio rises, whereas a DB system does. For risk-sharing purposes, a
partially-privatized system (say, combining a smaller DC plan with
individual accounts) is therefore equivalent to a mixture of a DB and DC
system. A conditionally-funded DB system mimics a partially-privatized
system with regard to anticipated demographic changes, but it behaves like
a pure DB system when unexpected changes occur.
Fourth, none of the above systems is fully efficient. Efficient
policy responses (if any) should take place as soon as a demographic shock
is revealed. Moreover, efficiency requires that all risks are shared by all
generations, making no exception for current retirees. This requirement is
violated by DB and DC systems because both fail to vary current retiree
benefits in anticipation of future changes in the retiree-worker ratio,
e.g., when the current birthrate changes. I have argued elsewhere (Bohn
1998b) that the political viability of social security requires at least a
one-period-ahead commitment to retiree benefits (see also McHale 1999).
6 In the current reform debate, increased longevity is often cited to justify an increased
“normal” retirement age, i.e., reduced benefits for a given retirement age. Some proposals
even call for an indexing of the retirement age to life-expectancy. The efficiency
considerations of this paper provide support for such proposals only if the accidental
bequest channel is empirically important. This is an open question.
5This may explain why the political debate takes for granted that current
retirees are exempt from reforms. From a risk-sharing perspective, such an
exemption is nonetheless a glaring inefficiency.
Though this paper focuses on demographic risks, I should briefly
comment on other sources of uncertainty, notably on productivity risk and
stock market risk.7 Productivity shocks are arguably the most important
source of long-run uncertainty about wages and capital income (Bohn 1998c).
In an OG setting, productivity risk is not necessarily allocated
efficiently across cohorts. Policy tools such as government debt and social
security implicitly shift risk across cohorts (Bohn 1998a). Social
security, especially a wage-indexed system, has an important role in this
context, because it provides a means of intergenerational redistribution
that is more “neutral” with regard to risk-shifting than government debt.
Stock market risk has recently received considerable attention in the
social security literature. Here one should distinguish work on
“privatized” retirement (investment options in “individual accounts”) from
work on intergenerational risk sharing through the social security trust
fund. Individual accounts are essentially irrelevant from a generational
perspective because the returns accrue to the contributors (Bohn 1997).
Trust fund investments, on the other hand, re-allocate risk across
generations, because future tax payers are the residual claimants in any DB
system. Bohn (1997, 1988c), Smetters (1997, 1999), Shiller (1998), and Abel
(1998, 1999) discuss some of the positive and normative implications of
alternative trust fund investments. This paper abstracts from most
financial market issues to focus on demographics. But I include a simple
7 There is also a huge literature on how social security helps to share individual-level
risks such as disability, mortality, and cross-sectional income uncertainty (see, e.g.,
Storesletten et al. 1998). Such risks may well be responsible for the existence and
popularity of social security, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.
6productivity shock to demonstrate that shocks to the labor force have very
different welfare implications than productivity shocks even though both
have the same impact on effective capital-labor ratio. The productivity
shock also illustrates how easily other shocks could be added.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 examines the risk sharing implications of alternative social
security policies. Section 4 studies the implications of missing annuities
markets and of accidental bequests. Section 5 derives necessary conditions
for efficient risk sharing and their implications for social security
policy. Section 6 comments on extensions of the model and on empirical
issues. Section 7 concludes.
2. A Model with Stochastic Population Growth
This section examines risk sharing in a modified Diamond (1965)-style OG
model with stochastic population growth and stochastic total factor
productivity.
2.1. Population Dynamics and Preferences
In the Diamond model, generation t enters as working-age adults in period t
and retires in period t+1. For modeling demographic uncertainty, it is
important, however, that individuals are born long before they enter the
labor force. In terms of generational time units, society has about one
period advance notice about changes in the retiree-worker ratio. Hence, I
will assume that generation t is born in period t-1, works in period t, and
retires in period t+1. At time t, NCt is the number of generation t+1
children, NWt the number of generation t workers, and NRt the number of
generation t-1 retirees.
7To limit the scope of the paper, I assume throughout that
childbearing is exogenous. Each of the NWt workers of generation t has bt
children, so that NCt = NWt×bt. To make the future workforce somewhat
unpredictable, I assume that only a fraction m1t+1 of children survives into
adulthood.8 Then the growth rate of the workforce, NWt+1/NWt = m1t+1×NCt/NWt =
m1t+1×bt  = 1+nWt+1, is partially predictable, but not perfectly. The
variables m1t (survival rate) and bt (birth rate) are assumed i.i.d.
Throughout, individuals in a cohort are identical, individual survival
probabilities equal the aggregate survival rate, and all variables are
treated as continuous, including bt.
Parents care about their children’s consumption when the children
live in their household. Their preferences do not include an altruistic
bequest motive, however. This assumption is important because fiscal policy
would be irrelevant if all generations were linked through Ricardian
bequests. Since Altonji et al. (1996) find that private intergenerational
risk sharing is highly imperfect empirically, it is a reasonable assumption
in this context. Bequests may nonetheless occur “accidentally” if mortality
is stochastic and annuity markets are imperfect, as I will explain below.
Parents make decisions about their own consumption cWt and about their
childrens’ consumption c0t (per child). Throughout, I assume homothetic




be the parent’s period-t utility, where h>0 is the inverse elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. The per-child weight r0(bt) may depend on the
number of children: it seems reasonable to assume that 0<r0(bt)£rW and that
8 Otherwise, NWt+1=NCt would be known at time t. One may also interpret m1t+1 as
reflecting uncertainty about immigration. But since immigration would raise subtle welfare
questions (how to include immigrants in the welfare function), I will not address
immigration explicitly and interpret all uncertainty about NW
t+1 as survival uncertainty.
8bt×r0(bt) is non-decreasing in the number of children. For any level of
household consumption c1t = cWt + bt×c0t, the parent’s optimality condition
bt×rW×(cWt)-h = r0(bt)×(c0t)-h then implies that u1t can be written as an
indirect utility over household consumption, u1t(c1t) = r1(bt)×(c1t)1-h/(1-h),
where r1(bt) = rW×[1+bt×(r0(bt)/bt/rW)1/h]h depends on the number of children.
Under the assumptions above, the elasticity of the weight r1 with respect to
the birth rate, g r = ¶r1/¶bt·(bt/r1), is in the interval 0£gr£h.
Overall, children matter for the analysis for two reasons. Their
birth provides advance notice about the size of future adult cohorts, and
they affect their parents spending needs. Thus, the model accounts not only
for old-age dependency but also for variations in youth-dependency.
Otherwise, the model with children works just like Diamond’s two-period OG
model.
Now consider retirement. As old-age survival improves, more workers
survive into the retirement period and those who survive live longer. For
social security, these changes matter only through their combined impact on
the ratio of retirees to workers.9 For individual behavior, however, an
anticipated longer life span may have different implications than a reduced
probability of a sudden death. For a known life span, retiree consumption
needs are presumably proportional to the length of the retirement period.
Retiree consumption needs will also increase if the rate of unanticipated
deaths declines in a setting with fair annuities. This is because
individuals without bequest motive will place all their assets into
annuities. The return on fair annuities is inversely related to the average
9 The two changes may have different effects if the social security replacement rate
varies with age or if one accounts for Medicare. In the U.S., social security is fixed in
real terms at retirement, so that the replacement rate tends to fall with age, but the
value of Medicare is rising with age. In the model, the replacement rate is assumed
constant within each generational period.
9survival rate. Hence, a rising survival rate will require more retirement
savings to support a given consumption level, as in the case of a longer
life span. If annuities are unavailable, however, or too expensive to be
commonly used, a rising survival rate increases the probability that
retirees can enjoy their savings. It mainly reduces accidental bequests and
does not increase retirees resource requirements. These different cases
have different policy implications and therefore deserve to be modeled
carefully.
To capture a variable life-expectancy in the OG setting, I model the
retirement period as a fractional period. At the start of period t, a
fraction 1-m2t of all generation t-1 workers dies. The remainder, m2t,
learns that they will live for a period of length ftÎ(0,1]. Both the
survival probability and the conditional length of life have predictable
and unanticipated components: m2t=m2et-1×m2ut and ft=fet-1×fut, where m2ut and
fut are i.i.d. shocks revealed at the start of period t, while m2et-1 and
fet-1 are i.i.d. shocks revealed in period t-1.10 The product m2et-1×fet-1 may
be interpreted as the life-expectancy at retirement. Conditional on
survival, the period-t utility of the old is assumed proportional to the
length of life, u2t+1 = ft×(c2t+1)1-h/(1-h).11
Finally, generation t’s overall preferences combine the utility over
working age consumption u1t(c1t) and retirement consumption u2t+1(c2t+1),
10 For simplicity, I treat ft and m2t as level-stationary even though technical progress
in medical technology suggest an upward drift. Drift terms would require an analysis of
“unbalanced” growth paths. This could be done (see Bohn 1998b for a deterministic
analysis), but it would be cumbersome and not provide new insights about risk-sharing.
Autocorrelation could also be accommodated, but it would not affect the main results and
is therefore omitted.
11 One may interpret u2
t as an indirect utility obtained by maximizing  ò0
ft [c(s)]1-h/(1-h)
ds over a continuous consumption stream c(s), subject to a resource constraint limiting
ò0
ft c(s)ds. Implicitly, this abstracts from within-period interest and discounting.
10(1) Ut = I1t × [u1t(c1t) + I2t+1 × r2 × u2t+1(c2t+1)]
   = 
1
1-h×I1t×[r1(bt)×(c1t)1-h + r2×ft+1×I2t+1×(c2t+1)1-h],
where the random variables I1t and I2t+1 are 0-1 indicators for individual
survival into adulthood and retirement, and r2 captures time preference. In
expectation, E[I1t] = E[m1t] = m1 and Et[ft+1×I2t+1] = fet×m2et are equal to
the respective aggregate values.
Overall, the population dynamics are such that the future labor force
and the future worker-retiree ratio are quite predictable one period ahead,
but not perfectly. This limited predictability is important for modeling
social security because it motivates why policy reforms are debated with
some lead time before demographic changes actually take place.
2.2. The Macroeconomic Setting
The macroeconomic setting is intentionally kept simple to focus on the
demographics. Each working-age person inelasticly supplies one unit of
labor. Output is produced with capital Kt and labor NWt,
(2) Yt = Kta×(At×NWt)1-a,
where a is the capital share and At is the economy’s total factor
productivity. Productivity follows a stochastic trend At = (1+at)×At-1 with
i.i.d. growth rate at. Capital depreciates at the rate d, implying a
national resource constraint
(3) Yt + (1-d)×Kt = c1t×NWt + c2t×ft×m2t×NWt-1 + Kt+1.
Some extensions are examined in Section 6.12
The wage rate wt = (1-a)×At×[Kt/(At×NWt)]a and the return on capital Rkt
= a×[Kt/(At×NWt)]a-1 + (1-d) both depend on the capital-labor ratio. Since Kt
is known in period t-1, it is convenient to define the state variable kt-1 =
12 Bohn (1998a) has shown how this setting can be generalized, e.g., to include a variable
labor supply, temporary productivity, CES-technology, and government spending, but such
complicating features would be distracting here.
11Kt/(At-1×NWt-1) that scales the capital stock by lagged productivity and the
lagged labor force. Wages and interest rates then depend on kt-1, on current
productivity growth, and on the current workforce growth.
To model policy, I abstract from all government activity but social
security.13 The government collects payroll taxes on wages wt at a rate qt
from all workers and pays benefits to retirees at a replacement rate bt. The
cost of social security is the product of the number of surviving retirees,
NRt=m2t×NWt-1, their length of life ft, and the level of benefit bt×wt. The
system’s revenues are qt×wt×NWt. For given replacement rate bt, the PAYGO
budget constraint therefore implies a payroll tax rate of
(4) qt = bt × ft×m2t×
NWt-1
NWt




The ratio (ft×m2t)/(bt-1×m1t) can be interpreted as the “average” retiree-
worker ratio (after smoothing over ft).
Interesting special cases of the PAYGO system are the defined-benefit
(DB) system with bt=b* and the defined-contribution (DC) system with qt=q*
and bt=(1+nWt)/(ft×m2t)×q*. Since individuals are not liquidity-constrained,
government-mandated savings (sometimes called “privatized” or “individual
accounts” systems) would simply reduce private savings (Bohn 1997). A
privatized social security system is therefore equivalent to q*=0. In a
mixed system consisting of individual accounts plus a PAYGO component, one
should interpret qt and bt as the taxes and benefits of the PAYGO component.
A system with government-run trust funds is somewhat more
complicated, if the system promises benefits that do not depend on the
performance of the trust fund (as in the U.S.). Generational accounting
implies that each cohort’s net benefits are equal to the system’s PAYGO
13 This approach is nonetheless quite general because government transfers matter only
through different cohorts’ generational accounts. Hence, social security can be
interpreted broadly as a stand-in for other intergenerational transfers.
12component, i.e., to the statutory benefits minus the proceeds from the
trust fund built up by the same cohort’s payroll taxes (see Bohn 1997). In
the U.S., the buildup of the current trust fund started in 1983 in response
to a funding gap in the Social Security Administration’s long run
projections. Projected funding gaps are similarly influencing the current
debate. Such gaps arise from two principal sources, rising life-expectancy
and reduced birth rates. Hence, one may interpret the current U.S. system
as a defined-benefits system that accumulates trust funds in response to
either a rise in life-expectancy, m2et×fet, and/or a fall in the birth rate
bt. Since a trust fund buildup is equivalent to a reduction in net
benefits, such a “conditionally prefunded” system can represented
parsimoniously by a benefit function bt = b(m2et,fet,bt) with ¶b/¶m2e<0,
¶b/¶fe<0, and ¶b/¶b>0.
McHale’s (1999) analysis of recent pension reforms around the world
suggests that a variable benefit function of this type is empirically
realistic for other countries, too. In the countries studied by McHale,
reforms were generally triggered by anticipated funding gaps. Benefits to
current retirees remained virtually unchanged, but benefits to future
generations were reduced. This implies a benefit function with the same
features as in the conditionally prefunded system.
More generally, a variety of social security systems with and without
prefunding can be reinterpreted as PAYGO systems with an appropriately
state-contingent benefit function. Hence, I will use the PAYGO notation
throughout the paper.
132.3. Individual Behavior
Individuals maximize their expected utility (1) subject to their budget
constraints. The main complications are potential imperfections in the
market for private annuities.
When working, individuals earn an after-tax wage income wt×(1-qt) and
possibly receive accidental bequests Q1t (defined below). Denoting savings
by st, the first period budget equation is
(5) c1t = wt×(1-qt) + Q1t - st.
If fair annuities exist, they offer a return Rkt+1/m2t+1, which is above the
return on non-annuitized savings.14 Hence, all savings should be annuitized.
Empirically, private annuities are so costly, however, that the bulk of
private savings is not annuitized (Congressional Budget Office 1998).
To gauge the significance of this apparent market imperfection, first
consider the case with fair annuities. If all assets are annuitized,
surviving retirees will spend their private resources Rkt+1/m2t+1×st at the
rate 1/ft+1, and there are no bequests. Retirement consumption (including
receipts from social security) is then
(6a) c2t+1 = 
Rst+1
m2t+1×ft+1
 × st + bt×wt+1,
and savings are determined by the individual optimality condition





Note that mortality cancels out in (7a). Also, all individual and policy
constraints depend on the length of life and on the survival rate only
through their product ft×m2t. Hence, under the assumption of perfect
14 One may either assume that individual annuity payoffs are indexed to the ex-post
survival rate m2t+1; or, if annuity contracts promise a payoff Rkt+1/m2
e
t linked to the
expected survival rate, one may note that annuity firms are owned, like all other firms,
by the old, so that the annuity firms’ aggregate profit Rkt+1-m2t× Rkt+1/m2
e
t accrues to the
old. In either case, the old bear the risk of unexpected mortality changes.
14annuities, survival uncertainty m2t can be subsumed into ft and does not
have to examined separately.
In contrast, if annuities do not exist, those who die at the start of
their retirement period must leave accidental bequests. On aggregate,
bequests of
(8)  Rkt+1×st×(1-m2t+1)·NWt = Q1t+1·NWt+1 + Q2t+1·NRt+1
accrue either to workers (the next generation, Q1t+1) or to other retirees
(the same generation, Q2t+1).
The surviving retirees will spend their private resources Rkt+1×st at
the rate 1/ft+1. Including bequests and social security, retirement
consumption is
(6b) c2t+1 = 
Rkt+1
ft+1




Savings are determined by the first order condition





Savings decisions now involve the probability of survival, m2et, and they
are distorted because individuals do not value bequests. Moreover,
accidental bequests affect the distribution of resources across cohorts to
the extent that they go to the young (if Q1t>0).15
Despite this multitude of effects, annuities turn out to be
relatively unimportant except for studying time-varying survival
probabilities per se (see Section 4). Intuitively, savings distortions
(m2et<1) affect the level of economic activity but they leave the
propagation of other shocks and their impact on the different cohorts
15 If all bequests go to the old, missing annuities have only an incentive effect but no










 × s t
is the same as with annuities.
15largely unchanged. And bequests (Q1>0) give the young some exposure to
shocks affecting capital income, but the impact is proportional to the size
of such bequests relative to wage income, which is likely small.
Because of these complications and the fact that annuitized survival
risk is economically equivalent to length-of-life risk, I will abstract
from old-age survival risk for much of the analysis and instead focus on
length-of-life uncertainty (setting m2tºm2etº1). Since shocks to survival
uncertainty with fair annuities can be subsumed into ft, the ft-shocks in
this analysis can be interpreted as reflecting both shocks to the length of
life and “diversifiable” (through annuitization) survival uncertainty. When
I explicitly add survival uncertainty later (Section 4), it will be
sufficient to model the case without annuities, because annuitized survival
uncertainty is already covered under ft.
With either assumption about annuities, the basic dynamics are
similar to the Diamond (1965) model. Each period, the young divide their
wage income (and bequests, if any) between consumption and savings. Savings
determine the next period’s capital stock, Kt+1 = NWt×st, which determines
the wage rate for the next young generation. Since I am not interested in
issues of dynamic inefficiency, I assume that r2×m2et/r1(bt) is low enough
(for all m2et, bt) that the economy is dynamically efficient.
With all the shocks and flexibly parametrized preferences, the model
does not generally have a closed form solution. As in Bohn (1998a), I
therefore follow the RBC and finance literature and examine log-linearized
solutions--analytically derived ones, however, not numerically simulated
ones. To ensure balanced growth, I assume a stationary policy rule for the
replacement rate bt. Without government, the model would have a Markov
structure with kt-1 and the shocks Z = {bt, bt-1, m1t, fut, fet, fet-1, m2ut,
16m2et, m2et-1, at} as state variables. Adding more state variables would be
uninteresting. I assume therefore that the policy rule is a function of at
most these variables, so that the model with government has the same
structure.16
Given the Markov structure, the log-deviation of any variable (y)
from the perfect foresight path is an approximately linear function of the
log-deviations of the state variables. Unless otherwise noted, let symbols
without time subscript refer to steady states and hats (^) denote log-




yt = pyk × ^
kt-1 +  å
zÎZ
 pyz × ^
zt.
where pyz denotes the coefficient for state variable z. The pyz coefficients
can be interpreted as elasticities of y with respect to z.
The main variables of interest are the consumption of workers and
retirees and the level of capital investment. Since the young divide their
labor income between consumption and savings, c1t and kt depend on all
shocks affecting the wage rate, on the incentives to save (Rkt+1), and on
the payroll tax. The consumption of the old depends on all shocks affecting
capital income and social security benefits; see (6a,b). The resulting
elasticity coefficients for various specifications of the model are listed
in several tables that will be discussed in the following sections.
16 Without government, one could treat nW
t and ft as state variables instead of their
components. The components will have different effects, however, if policy treats expected
and unexpected changes differently, e.g., in the conditionally prefunded system. Hence, I
treat the components of nWt and ft as distinct state variables throughout.
17 For example, 
^
c1t = ln(c1t)-ln(c1). When growth rates are involved, the “1+” is




18  An intercept term could be added to reflect average “displacements” from the
deterministic paths caused, e.g., by risk aversion and precautionary savings; see Bohn
(1998a). But since the focus here is on fluctuations and not level variables, intercept
terms are omitted.
17To illustrate the practical implications of the model, I will also
provide the elasticity coefficients implied by a simple numerical example.
For the example, assume a capital share of a=1/3, full depreciation (d=1),
payroll taxes of q=0.15, zero population growth (n=0), a steady state
productivity growth factor of 1+a=1.35 (1% annual growth for a 30-year
generational period), and an elasticity of substitution of 1/h=1/3. The
effective retirement period--length times probability--is l×m2=1/2 (where
l=1/2 and m2=1, except in Sec. 4) and the time preference r2 is set such
that in steady state workers save 25% of their disposable income.19
3. The Risk-Sharing Properties of Alternative Systems
This section examines the positive effects of demographic shocks on the
fortunes of different cohorts. The main sources of demographic uncertainty
are shocks to the workforce and shocks to the number of retirees. For this
section, I abstract from shocks that would trigger accidental bequests
(setting m2tºm2etº1) and assume that all variations in old-age mortality are
either changes in the known length of life or annuitized.
3.1. Defined Benefits
To start, consider an economy with constant social security benefits (DB).
It will provide a benchmark for studying variable benefits below. Table 1
summarizes the log-linearized equilibrium responses of workers and retirees
to various shocks.
19 The example is motivated by the calibrated OG model in Bohn (1998c); see there for a
discussion of calibration issues. The assumed full depreciation is a convenient
simplification, but it implies a caveat: Setting d=1 reduces the autocorrelation of
capital (pkk) and therefore understates the propagation of shocks. This is acceptable here,
because the analysis focuses on the impact effects. Setting d=1 also reduce the level of
Rk, which I offset by raising r2 enough that the savings rate roughly matches the empirical
investment share in GDP. This is why I calibrate savings and not the time preference.




m1t; Panel A). A large number of workers has a clear positive effect on
the old (pc2m1>0) because the reduced capital-labor ratio increases the old
generation’s capital income. The impact on the young is in principle
ambiguous. With a defined-benefit system, members of a large cohort pays
less social security taxes (q). But a large workforce also reduces the wage
rate, as captured by negative a-terms. The negative effects dominate
whenever a > q/(1-q). For plausible capital shares (0.3-0.4), this
inequality holds unless the tax rate is well over 20%. If a>q/(1-q),
workers’ income, consumption, and savings decline in response to a positive
shock to the workforce, whereas retiree consumption rises. This is also
true in the numerical example: a=1/3 > q/(1-q) = 0.176, pc1m1 = -0.131 and
pkm1 = -0.235 are negative, and pc2m1 = 0.436 is positive.
The main conclusion, to be reexamined below, is that for plausible
parameters, large cohorts tend to be demographically disadvantaged.
Conversely, being in a small cohort is beneficial. Even though small
cohorts face relatively high taxes under a defined-benefit system, they
also enjoy high wages and high returns on savings.
Second, consider shocks to the current birth rate bt (Table 1, Panel
B). If one ignores children’s expenses (setting g r=0 for this argument),
shocks to the birth rate are like shocks to the labor force that become
known one period in advance. With defined benefits, such shocks have no
impact on the old (pc2b=0). News about next period’s labor force are
relevant for the young, however, because they expect to be alive when the
shock actually hits the retiree-worker ratio. Looking forward, they know
that changes in bt have the same impact in period t+1 as the m1t+1-shocks
discussed above: A high birth rate bt has a positive effect on retired
19generation t workers. But provided a>q/(1-q), it has a negative effect on
generation-(t+1) workers.
The response of period-t workers is most likely an increase in
current consumption and a reduction in savings. Specifically, Table 1 shows
that the elasticities pc1b and pkb depend on the interaction of three
effects. First, expected retirement income rises because a high future
workforce reduces next period’s capital-labor ratio and raises the return
on current savings. This income effect is captured by the positive g c2nw-
term in pc1b and pkb. Second, the increased return triggers a substitution
effect in the opposite direction (the -pRk/h term). Finally, expenses for
children increases the consumption needs of working-age families (the g r
term with g r>0). Unless the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
high enough to offset both other effects, the net effects are higher
consumption (pc1b>0) and lower investment (pkb<0). In the numerical example,
these signs apply even for g r=0: pc1b = 0.08 and pkb=-0.24.20
Overall, a change in the birth rate triggers changes in consumption
and capital investment before it actually affects the labor supply. The
impact over time is traced out in Figures 1-2. For the figures, I consider
a one-time 20% reduction in the birth rate bt applied to the elasticities
of the numerical example.21  In period t, retirees (generation t-1) are
unaffected. Workers (generation t) realize that the next working-age cohort
20 Recall that grÎ[0,h]. For the upper bound gr=h=3, one obtains pc1b = 0.455 and pkb=-
1.365. Unless otherwise noted, I will use gr=0 for the example numbers, for simplicity and
to avoid exaggerating the birth rate effects.
21 The 20% is somewhat less than both the projected increase in the retiree-worker ratio
from 1990 to 2020 (the baby boom retirement) and the decline in the ratio of the age 0-29
population to the age 30-59 population between 1960 to 1990 (the baby bust). The example
is indicative of the shape of the impulse-response functions in general, provided a>q/(1-
q) and gc2nw+gr/h>pRk/h. One exception: For large gr, the sign of 
^





c2t+1 could be reversed, namely if reduced expenses for children
dominate the baby boomers’ behavior; but this seems unrealistic.
20will be small, which will reduce the return on savings. Assuming the
negative income effect dominates the substitution effect, generation t will
reduce their consumption c1t and raise savings kt. In period t+1, the lower
return reduces generation t’s consumption despite the increased savings
(see Fig.1). Generation (t+1)’s consumption rises, in contrast, because of
higher wages. Wages are higher because of the low labor supply and because
of the higher capital stock (see Fig.2). The increased wage outweighs the
increase in tax rates. Since the capital stock rises, subsequent
generations are better off, too.
Note that the increased period-t savings merely magnify the change in
period-(t+1) wages. A reduction in bt would make the baby bust generation
better off even if the preceding generation did not save more (say, if 1/h
were large enough that pkb=0). Increased savings further improve the
consumption opportunities of the baby bust generation and their successors,
but this savings response is not crucial.22
In terms of the current policy debate, the analysis here suggests we
are perhaps too worried about the baby bust generation and its ability to
pay defined benefits to the baby boomers. Instead, the baby bust generation
can look forward to a substantial growth in wages, whereas the baby boom
generation may suffer because the small succeeding cohort reduces the
return on capital.
The OG model produces strikingly different results than one would
obtain in a partial equilibrium analysis (say, a trend extrapolation of the
type used by the Social Security Administration). This is due to the
endogenous factor prices. If one took wages and interest rates as given, a
22 For proof, recall the analysis of m1t-shocks, where anticipation effects did not arise.
This point is worth noting because the prediction of higher savings is specific to the OG
approach. If one assumed Ricardian bequests instead, a fertility decline would likely
trigger a slight decline in savings; see Cutler et al. (1990).
21small workforce would leave retirees unaffected, it would make workers
worse off because of higher taxes, and since workers would save less, it
would make future generations worse off. If one accounts for factor price
effects, however, the partial equilibrium results are reversed. The impact
of factor price movements dominate the fiscal impact of labor force
changes.
The latter finding relies, of course, on the general equilibrium
properties of this particular two-period OG model. Perhaps most
significantly, the factor price effects would be smaller if the elasticity
of factor substitution were higher, e.g., with CES-technology. This and
other robustness issues are examined in Section 6.23




fut. A large number of retirees directly reduces retiree
consumption because the old have to spread their capital income over a
longer period (or in case of annuitized savings, over more people). Capital
investment and worker consumption are also reduced to the extent that an
increased retiree-worker ratio triggers higher payroll taxes. Thus,
defined-benefits social security helps to share the risk of shocks to the
length of life across cohorts.
Fourth, consider a current shock to fet, the expected length of life
(“life expectancy”) in period t+1. Table 1, Panel D shows that current
life-expectancy has an impact on the young, who will experience a longer
life, but no impact on the old (pc2fe=0, as in the case bt shocks). Looking
forward, a lagged length-of-life shock matters through its impact on the
actual number of retirees (ft+1), like the unexpected shock fut+1. The young
23 To avoid clutter, I proceed with the basic model and defer all extensions and empirical
issues.
22have an incentive to increase their savings and to reduce their current
consumption (pkfe>0, pc1fe<0).24 This risk is not shared with the old.
Finally, consider the capital and productivity coefficients in Table
1, Panel E. Not surprisingly, a high capital-labor ratio raises capital and
labor incomes, hence consumption and savings. This makes kt autocorrelated
and propagates shocks. Productivity shocks have a negative impact on
consumption and capital when scaled by productivity (c1t/At, c2t/At, and kt)
because a rise in At raises output less than one-for-one. In level terms,
however, a positive shocks to at raises consumption (c1t, c2t) and the per-
capita savings kt×At.
Since a shock to productivity affects the capital-labor ratio like an
unexpected shock to the workforce, one may wonder to what extent the m1t and
at shocks have similar effects. If social security is small (q»0), positive
shocks to at and m1t will indeed increase retiree consumption by the same
amount (1+pc2a=pc2m1 for q=0). They have very different effects on current
workers, however, since an increase in At raises the wage while a rise in
NWt reduces the wage rate. For q>0, at and m1t shocks also have different
effects on retirees because they have different distributional effects
through social security.
3.2. Variable Benefits
The analysis so far has shown that most shocks affect different generations
differently or even in opposite directions. This suggests some scope for
improved risk sharing. The section examines how the allocation of risk is
modified by policies with variable social security benefits.
24 The overall effects of increased life-expectancy over time could be traced out as in
Table 2, but the results would just confirm the increase in savings and the reduction in
per-capita consumption.
23Alternative policies are defined by their elasticity coefficients pbz,
i.e., by how the replacement rate b responds to different shocks. Table 2
shows how the equilibrium dynamics of consumption and capital investment
are affected in general by alternative pbz-values. To help interpret the
general results, Table 3 displays the elasticity coefficients corresponding
to the four main policy alternatives--the DB, DC, privatized, and
conditionally prefunded social security systems--in the numerical example.25
In general, the elasticity formulas in Table 2 include the same
elements as the corresponding formulas in Table 1, but there are additional
terms that capture the effects of a changing replacement rate. The policy
coefficients are generally weighted by the size of government transfers
relative to the cohort’s income, which is g c2b for retirees and -q/(1-q) for
workers. For workers, the impact is then divided between consumption and
savings in proportions Dc:Dk.
Any policy that reduces prospective benefits when the birth rate
declines and/or the life-expectancy rises is characterized by policy
coefficients pbb1>0 and/or pbfe1<0. A pure defined-contributions system
would have pbm1=pb1=1 and pbfu=pbfe1=-1. Since U.S. retirees have generally
been protected against unexpected shocks, the U.S. system seems to maintain
defined benefits with respect to unexpected changes (pbfu=pbm1=0), but
allows benefits to change after a phase-in, suggesting pbb1¹0 and pbfe1¹0.
The tax increases and the trust fund buildup since 1983 suggests that the
U.S. system is somewhere between a DC and a DB system with respect to
anticipated changes, i.e., 0<pbb1<1 and 0>pbfe1>-1. These stylized facts are
captured by the conditionally prefunded system (“Prefunded” in Table 3).
25 The numerical example is broadly indicative of how the elasticities compare in general.
24For the numerical illustration of this system, I assume pbb1=0.5 and pbfe1=-
0.5.
In case of shocks to the workforce, Table 3 (Panel A) shows that
defined contributions and privatized systems magnify the negative exposure
of workers to such shocks as compared to the DB case. They also magnify the
positive exposure of retirees. Table 2 (Panel A) shows that this is true in
general, whenever pbm1>0 and pbb1>0. In addition, pbb1>0 increases workers
instantaneous negative response to birth rate shocks (pkb<0 rises in
absolute value; see Table 2, Panel B). By making the capital-labor ratio
more volatile, pbb1>0 also exposes future generations to more risk. These
observations reinforce the insights from Table 1: Large cohorts are already
demographically disadvantaged at fixed benefits (DB). Hence, a policy of
giving them reduced benefits in order to stabilize tax rates is
counterproductive.26
In case of shocks to the current length of life, a system of defined
contributions leaves the old more exposed and allocates less risk to the
young than a DB system: In Table 2 (Panel C), if pbfe1<0 and/or pbfu<0, then
pc1fu, pc1fe1, pkfu, and pkfe1 are all lower in absolute value, whereas pc2fu
and pc2fe1 are increased. With a DC system, length-of-life risk falls
entirely on the old. The policy coefficient pbfe1 also influences how
period-t voters response to news about changes in the future length of life
(fet-shocks; see Table 2, Panel D). If workers anticipate reduced future
benefits, they save more (pbfe1<0 raises pkfe) and consume less (pbfe1<0
reduces pc1fe).
Table 2 provides several additional insights. First, the government
can influence the propagation of shocks through the capital-labor ratio
26 This verdict may raise questions about the welfare criterion. This will be addressed
below.
25(pkk) by making benefits a function of kt-1 (setting pbk¹0; see Panel E).
Second, the government can influence the incidence of productivity shocks
by varying pba. Third, note that for pbb=pbfe=0, only the workers bear the
risk of “bad” news about birth rates and life-expectancy (see Panels B and
D). By setting pbb,pbfe¹0 the government could spread such risks over young
and old. This is not done under any of the policies discussed above.
Overall, Table 3 provides a comparison of the main policy
alternatives. Under DC and private savings systems, all length-of-life risk
is carried by the old and none by the young. The DB and prefunded systems
shift some of these risks to the young. Under DC and private savings
systems, birth rate uncertainty and other shocks to the workforce have a
positive impact on the old but a negative impact on the young. This
negative comovement of worker and retiree consumption is reduced by the DB
and prefunded systems, but provided q/(1-q)<a, it is not eliminated.
4. Missing Annuities and Accidental Bequest
This section examines the ramifications of missing annuities and accidental
bequests. Without annuities, some shocks to old-age survival lead to
accidental bequests (m2-shocks). In addition, the existence of accidental
bequests affects the propagation of the shocks examined previously.
The macroeconomic dynamics of the log-linearized model without
annuities are summarized in Table 4. Recall that in the basic model, f-
shocks reduced retiree consumption while affecting worker consumption only
through a change in taxes. In contrast, if savings are not annuitized,
fewer unexpected deaths (higher m2ut or m2et-1) have a direct negative effect
on the young because of reduced bequests, while the old are affected only
through changes in benefits (see Panel A). If benefits are held constant,
the consumption of the young is further reduced because of higher taxes.
26Table 4, Panel A, also provides numerical values for the limiting
case of q»0 and a DB social security system. For q»0 and DB, survival
shocks affect the worker exactly like a length of live shock (see Table 1,
Panel C). The key difference is that retirees are unaffected. Hence, for
dealing with m2-type shocks, a movement towards defined contributions or
privatization looks much more promising than for f-type shocks.
Table 4, Panel B, illustrates how an increase in the expected future
probability of survival (m2e) increases workers’ incentives to save. Panels
C-G show how accidental bequests modify the other policy coefficients as
compared to Table 2. The modifications are proportional the ratio of
accidental bequests to bequests plus wage income (q). If this ratio is
small, as one might expect in practice, the previous results remain
virtually unchanged. For this reason, no new illustrative values are
provided.
5. Efficient Risk Sharing
If there is scope for risk-sharing, what exactly should be done? This
section derives a simple efficiency benchmark and explores its policy
implications. In general, the set of efficient (ex-ante Pareto-optimal)
allocations can be obtained by maximizing a welfare function




with welfare weights Wt-1>0, subject to the feasibility constraints (1)-(4)
and given K0.27 The efficiency conditions are
27 The definition of efficiency is non-trivial because one might instead consider a
welfare function with state-contingent weights. In a model without childhood period, Peled
(1982) has shown that the market allocation without government is Pareto-efficient if one
interprets generation-t individuals born in different states of nature as different
individuals and applies state-contingent weights. With a childhood period, the market
allocation is inefficient even with state-contingent weights. Moreover, Peled’s definition
is too weak here, because it would rationalize any shift of risk from current to unborn
generations as efficient (under some state-contingent welfare weights) and therefore make
the policy analysis vacuous. Readers who object on philosophical grounds to the notion of








and Lt = Et[Lt+1×Rkt+1],
where Lt is the shadow value of the resource constraint (4). Equivalently,
(12a) r1×(c1t)-h = Et[Rkt+1×r2×(c2t+1)-h],




define the efficient linkages of consumption over time and across
generations. Note that equation (12a) is identical to the individual
optimality condition (7a) for generation t’s savings with annuities. The
fundamentally new equation is (12b). It links period-t worker and retiree
consumption and it depends only on population growth and on the welfare
weights.
For risk sharing issues, it is again useful to distinguish the
economy’s perfect foresight path (obtained by setting all shocks to zero)
from the stochastic fluctuation around this path. For the log-deviations





c2t + g r/h×^
bt.
This is a strong restriction on the co-movements of worker and retiree
consumption: In any efficient allocation, both generations consumption must
respond in equal proportions to ALL unexpected disturbances, except to the
extent that parents’ consumption needs vary with the number of children
(bt).
The key underlying assumption is CRRA utility, which assigns an equal
relative risk aversion to both generations. For utility functions with age-
unborn individuals may instead interpret the state-independent weights as an assumption of
“distributional neutrality,” meaning that we are looking for allocations in which the
government does not arbitrarily value individuals born in one state of nature more highly
than individuals with equal consumption born in another state.
28dependent risk aversion, Bohn (1998a) has shown that macroeconomic risks
would be shared in inverse proportion to the relative risk aversions. The
same would be true here, but age-dependent risk-aversion would
unnecessarily complicate the analysis. Age-dependent risk aversion would
not, in any case, overturn the basic point that all risks should be shared
across generations.
In addition to sharing risks between living generations, government
policy has the ability to re-allocate risks between current and future
generation by imposing history-dependent policies. This is generally
necessary to obtain a first-best allocation and it typically involves
making policies a function of the capital-labor ratio kt-1 (see Bohn 1998a).
For the analysis here, making bt a function of kt-1 would be a distraction.
Instead, I focus on the necessary efficiency condition (13) when comparing
alternative social security systems. Its key implication for the elasticity
coefficients is that for all shocks, the consumption coefficients for
workers and retirees should be equal. The only exception are the bt-
coefficients to the extent that expenses for children matter.
Applied to the different demographic shocks, the optimality condition
(13) yields a set of optimal policy coefficients p*bz that are displayed in
Table 5.
For shocks to the actual workforce (m1t, bt-1), the optimal policy
coefficients p*bm1 and p*bb1 are clearly negative for reasonable a and q
values. This is true not only for a>q/(1-q), but even for higher q values,
provided
(14) a + (g c2nw+Dc×q×pRk)/D*c > q/(1-q).
Since the bracketed term is positive, this strengthens the previous
observation that large cohorts are worse off than small cohorts even with
29PAYGO-DB. Intuitively, the bracketed term captures the impact of interest
rate movements that favor small cohorts. In the numerical example,
p*bm1=p*bb1=-1.5 are far below zero. Applied to the current baby boom/bust
situation, this implies that benefits should be increased as the baby boom
cohort retires. This is contrary to most proposals in the current policy
debate.
The optimal response to a current birth rate shock (bt) is somewhat
more complicated. In the formula for p*bb in Table 5, if g c2nw-pRk/h>0, the
positive income effect of higher future returns on capital exceeds the
substitution effect and tends to increase worker consumption. Efficiency
would call for this “windfall” to be shared with the old through higher
benefits. On the other hand, if pbb1=p*bb1<0 takes its optimal negative
value, worker income is reduced, which would call for a benefit reduction.
The g r term reflects the cost of children. If workers have higher expenses
for more children, a reduction in social security benefits would be
efficient. The sum of these effects has an ambiguous sign.
In the numerical example, p*bb=0.212 is positive if pbb1=0 (e.g., with
DB), p*bb=0.441 is even higher if pbb1=1 (e.g., with DC), but p*bb=-0.131
takes a negative value if pbb1=p*bb1=-1.5 is set optimally. Intuitively, the
lagged policy response pbb1 matters because workers’ period-t decisions
depend on how they expect to be treated by the government as retirees. If a
rise in the birth rate signals no change in future benefits (with DB) or
increased retirement benefits (with DC), workers expect to be very well off
as retirees and increase their current consumption. The optimality
condition (13) implies that the good fortune should be shared with current
retirees.  A reduced birth rate--the current U.S. scenario--would then call
for an immediate benefit cut. If future benefits are set optimally, on the
30other hand, a rise in the birth rate signals a benefit cut, and workers
will reduce their consumption. Then the optimal current policy response has
the reverse sign.
In any case, efficiency calls for current retirees to share the
impact of birth rate shocks. And unless the baby boomers are confident that
future policy-makers will follow the advice of this paper (that p*bb1<0)
rather than the thrust of the current social security debate (moving
towards pbb1>0), they are well advised to reduce current consumption and to
save more.
Next, consider length-of-life shocks without impact on accidental
bequests (fut, fet-1). Recall that in a DB system both generations’
consumption falls in response to an increase in the length of life. The
optimal policy response therefore depends on the relative impact. For
reasonably small q values, the old are more affected than the young (recall
Table 1, Panel C). Then the benefits to the old should be increased in
response to longer life expectancy, i.e., p*bfu=p*fe1>0. In the numerical
example, p*bfu=p*fe1=1.647 is indeed far above zero.
Without annuities, the results are different. With defined benefits,
only the young would bear the cost of survival shocks (m2ut, m2et-1). A
benefit reduction, p*bm2u=p*m2e1<0, is therefore efficient. Provided m2 and q
are small enough that g c2b > q·m2/(1-m2)×q/(1-q), the optimal policy is in
the range -1 < p*bm2u=p*m2e1 < 0, so that efficiency calls at most for a
partial movement to DC. In the numerical example, one finds p*bm2u=p*m2e1=-
0.389.
Overall, if one asks the broad question of how social security should
respond to lower mortality per se, the right answer is that it depends on
the type of shock. If the type is unknown, the large positive p*-
31coefficient for f-shocks in the numerical example as compared to the small
negative coefficient for m2-shocks suggests that there is no strong case
for a benefit reduction.
Finally, for shocks to current life-expectancy (fet and m2et), recall
that both shocks reduce the consumption of the young without directly
affecting the old (See Table 1, Panel D; Table 4, Panel B). Hence, the
optimal policy response is to reduce the benefits to the old, p*bfe<0 and
p*bm2e<0.28 Intuitively, increased life-expectancy requires resources in the
future, so that the young need to save more. For the old to share the
burden, current social security benefits should be reduced immediately.
This conclusion applies regardless of the state of annuity markets.
In the current reform debate, many proposals call for a reduction in
benefits as mortality declines, e.g., by increasing the retirement age. The
analysis here suggests that the efficiency of such benefit cuts depends
importantly on their timing. Cuts are efficient if they are imposed quickly
(at time t, p*bfe<0), but not if they are imposed so late that they fall on
the longer-lived cohort itself (at time t+1, p*bfe1>0). None of the systems
discussed in the current reform debate is efficient in this sense, nor is
the current policy debate moving in the direction of cutting benefits to
current retirees.
6. Extensions and Empirical Issues
The magnitude of factor price movements in response to demographic shocks
was a key issue in the analysis above. Is the model consistent with the
28 In the numerical example, one finds p*bfe=-0.76 if pbfe1=0 and p*bfe=-1.14 if
pbfe1=p*bfe1=1.647. Without annuities, p*bm2e=-0.057 if pbm2e1=0 and p*bm2e=-0.146 if
pbm2e1=p*bm2e1=-0.389. The pbfe1 and pbm2e1 coefficients matter because workers take the
expected future policy response to any shock to life-expectancy into account when they
decide about their consumption (as explained in the case of bt shocks).
32empirical evidence? Are there natural extensions of the model that would
yield different results? To address these concerns, this section comments
on the empirical evidence and on some extensions of the model.
6.1. Empirical Evidence
The most direct way to settle questions about the factor price effects of
demographic change would be to refer to empirical evidence, if convincing
evidence were available. This is not the case, however. The main problem is
that for generational issues, a single observation takes 20-30 years of
data. In terms of generational time units, we have only 2-3 observations
for the U.S. economy with social security, perhaps 4-5 for countries like
Germany. Even the idea of retirement--that it is normal for non-disabled
adults to stop working just because of their age--is fairly novel. Hence,
there are no time series data of sufficient length and stationarity
(without serious structural breaks) to allow credible statistical
inferences.29
There is, however, some indirect evidence about the impact of
demographic changes on wages. First, there is a large literature on cross-
country growth that suggests a negative correlation between population
growth (or fertility) and per-capita income (notably Mankiw et al, 1992;
see also Cutler et al. 1990). Assuming near-constant labor shares (Cobb-
Douglas production), this suggest a negative correlation between population
growth and wages.30
Second, there is a labor economics literature examining linkages
between demographics and relative wages (e.g., Welch, 1979; Berger, 1985;
29 Poterba (1998) makes similar arguments.
30 There is some debate about the strength of this relation; see Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995) and Temple (1998). While cross-sectional evidence is attractive to circumvent the
lack of multi-generation time series, it also raises new concerns about causality and
control variables. Hence, the evidence should be interpreted cautiously.
33Easterlin, 1987; Murphy and Welch, 1992; Macunovich, 1998).31 Easterlin and
Macunovich focus almost exclusively on demographics and argue that the
effects are large. Welch (1979) and Berger (1985) find significant negative
effects of cohort size on cohort wages, though they disagree about the
persistence over a worker’s career. Murphy and Welch (1992) argue that
demographic variables are only a minor determinant of relative wages, but
even they find non-trivial cohort effects.
To be conservative, I will focus on Welch (1979) and Murphy-Welch
(1992). Welch’s (1979) elasticity estimates for the “persistent” impact of
cohort-size (narrowly defined as a 5-year age window) on annual wage income
are around -0.20, with some variation across education categories. Murphy
and Welch’s simulations (1992, p.324) imply that a 20% increase in the
number of young workers reduces their wages by 6-15%, suggesting an
elasticity of relative wages in the range -0.30 to -0.75.
For comparison, the OG model assumes an elasticity of wages with
respect to the aggregate workforce of -a or about -0.33, a value well
within the range of elasticities above. Moreover, if capital-owners have
some ability to substitute labor across narrowly defined age cohorts, the
elasticity of wages with respect to the aggregate workforce should be at
least as high as the relative-supply elasticities. Thus, the assumptions of
the OG model are not inconsistent with the labor economics evidence.
Finally, I should comment on the relation between demographics and
the return on capital. The recent review by Poterba (1998) finds little
evidence of a systematic relation. Poterba suggests that this may be due to
the small number of generational degrees of freedom. Theoretical
considerations suggest an additional rationalization: If old capital is a
31 This literature should also be interpreted cautiously. Despite the richness of panel
data, the data provide aggregate information about only 1-2 generations.
34large share of the total return (if (1-d)/Rk is near one), then the
elasticity of Rk with respect to the capital-labor ratio is small and may
be difficult to detect empirically.32 Thus, the inability to find an
empirical link between demographics and stock returns is not inconsistent
with the model.
6.2. CES-Production
From a theoretical perspective, the magnitude of factor price movements
depends importantly on the elasticity of factor substitution. By assuming
Cobb-Douglas technology, the analysis above implicitly assumes a unit
elasticity. An elasticity of factor substitution above 1.0 will imply
smaller factor price changes than with Cobb-Douglas, and hence, a different
allocation of risk. To examine the importance of this issue, this section
replaces Cobb-Douglas by CES production.
For this section only, let output be produced with a CES-technology,
Yt = [aj×Kt1/(1-j)+(1-aj)×(At×NWt)1/(1-j)]1-j, where j is the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor, and 0<aj<1. Cobb-Douglas technology
is covered as the limiting case j®1. Leaving all other assumptions
unchanged (and setting m2=1 for simplicity), the economy is still a Markov
process with unchanged state variables, but with modified dynamics.
Table 6 summarizes the consumption and investment dynamics with CES-
production. The key difference to Table 2 is that the elasticities of the
wage and the return on capital with respect to movements in the capital-
labor ratio are scaled down by a factor j.33 In the young generation’s
32 For annual data, Bohn (1998c) suggest (1-d)/Rk » 85% so that pRk»0.10. (In the numerical
example, the role of d was ignored for simplicity.) The same argument suggests that the
transmission of demographics to the stock market may occur in part through variations in
the value of old capital (say, if 1-d is stochastic), and not only through the production
function. This is an open question left for future research.
33 A variable factor share also complicates the calculation of the old generation’s income
and it alters the propagation of shocks.
35response to birth rate shocks, a is replaced by a/j, and in pRk, (1-a)/j
replaces (1-a), where a is now the steady state capital share.
The impact of birth rate and other workforce shocks on the fortunes
of differently-sized cohorts now depends on the relation between a/j to
q/(1-q). Given a defined-benefit social security system, unexpected shocks
to the labor force are beneficial to a small cohort if and only if
(15) a/j > q/(1-q).
For elasticity values j<1, this inequality is satisfied even more clearly
than for Cobb-Douglas. To overturn (15), one would have to argue that the
capital-labor elasticity is far above one. In the numerical example with
q=15% and a=1/3, one would need an elasticity above 1.88. The empirical
production literature suggests, however, that the elasticity is probably
below rather than above one (e.g., Lucas 1969). Hence, it is difficult to
question (15) on the basis of production theory.
Outside the model, one might think of international capital and labor
movements as factors that could weaken the link between U.S. factor
supplies and factor prices. If one interprets 1/j more broadly as
parametrizing the magnitude of factor price movements in response to
demographic change, increased openness might be interpreted as an increased
j-value. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) have documented, however, that
international savings-investment linkages have historically been
unimportant, justifying a closed economy analysis.34
Thus, concerns that the Cobb-Douglas assumption might over-emphasize
factor price movements are probably unwarranted. Based on production
34  Also, openness would presumably matter most if demographic change abroad were
orthogonal to the U.S. But many other countries are undergoing a similar demographic
transition as the U.S.
36function estimates, Cobb-Douglas might even understate the factor price
movements, which would give small cohorts an even better starting position.
6.3. Elastic Labor Supply
Elastic labor supply is another consideration that could change the impact
of demographics. The most serious concern is that if small cohorts supplied
more labor, birth rate changes would have a reduced impact on the capital-
labor ratio and on factor prices.
A complete model with endogenous labor supply would complicate the
analysis too much to fit into this already long paper. Some results can be
obtained quite easily, however. Assume DB social security and Cobb-Douglas
technology. Then at any level of per-capita labor supply, a large cohort
will face a lower after-tax wage than a smaller cohort if and only if the
inequality a>q/(1-q) is satisfied. Thus, large cohorts face a relatively
reduced opportunity set. This shows that labor supply considerations cannot
overturn the basic qualitative finding that large cohorts are
demographically disadvantaged for a>q/(1-q).
Quantitatively, the implications of a variable labor supply depend on
a tradeoff between income and substitution effects. The negative income
effect of a low wage may induce a large cohort to work more, while the
negative substitution effect would encourage taking leisure. If the
substitution effect is weak, a variable labor supply might even magnify
movements in the effective capital-labor ratio.
6.4. Time-Aggregation
Factor price changes and cohort welfare may also be affected by time-
aggregation. If one used a more elaborate model of the life-cycle with
multiple working-age periods, large and small cohorts might overlap in the
labor force, leading to reduced fluctuations in the labor force and in the
37retiree-worker ratio. In addition, “middle-aged” workers might supply both
capital and labor, which would reduce the welfare-impact of factor price
changes.35 Are such extensions likely to overturn the results obtained here?
A more disaggregate approach would clearly yield different
quantitative implications, but it is doubtful that these modifications will
overturn any important results. To see why, first consider labor supply.
Suppose one started out with, say, cohorts defined by the year of birth.
Then the significance of being in a small or large birth cohort depends on
the persistence of birth rate shocks and on the substitutability of wages
across birth cohorts. If workers of different age are close substitutes,
wage movements are small unless the aggregate labor force varies
significantly. And if shocks are temporary, they would have little impact
on the labor force. The baby boom/bust phenomenon suggest, however, that
demographic shocks have enough persistence to matter at generational
frequencies. And the labor literature (see above) suggests that
substitution across cohorts is not perfect.
To sidestep any controversy about relative wage effects, assume for
the sake of argument that all workers are perfect substitutes.36 If small
and large cohorts overlap in the labor force, it is true that the magnitude
of wage fluctuations would be less than in a crude model that abstracts
from such overlap. However, the same overlap would also reduce the
fluctuations in the PAYGO tax rate, and by the same percentage. Provided
a>q/(1-q), changes in the workforce still affect wages more than taxes.
Thus, an overlap of large and small cohorts in the workforce is unlikely to
affect the relative importance of fiscal versus factor price effects.
35 I would like to thank Kevin Murphy, the discussant, for raising this issue. Kevin also
raised the issue of retirees receiving labor income, but I doubt that this is
quantitatively as significant.
36 Otherwise, even changes in narrowly defined cohorts would have factor price effects.
38Second, consider the issue of middle-aged workers receiving both
capital and labor income. This issue is not about the size of factor price
changes but about their welfare impact. Members of a large cohort are less
worse off than in the basic model, if they receive some of the high capital
incomes generated by their own large cohort size. Note, however, that
demographically driven changes in the return to capital were only one of
several “transmission mechanisms” in the analysis above. Smaller cohorts
would be better off than large ones even if the return on capital were held
constant. To make large cohorts better off, the demographic effects trough
the return to capital would have to outweigh the effects through the after-
tax wage. Empirically, most of the gross return on aggregate capital on an
annual basis is due to the value of old capital (see above). The “within-a-
generation” elasticity of Rk with respect to the capital-labor ratio is
therefore likely small. In addition, households tend to accumulate
financial assets fairly late in their careers (Poterba 1998). Hence, the
receipt of capital income by worker households is unlikely to overturn the
results from the basic OG model.
7. Conclusions
The paper examines demographic uncertainty in a neoclassical growth model
with overlapping generations. I compare the allocation of risk implied by
alternative social security policies to the ex-ante efficient allocation.
The policy answers depend significantly on how strongly factor prices
respond to demographic change. For plausible tax rates and elasticities of
factor substitution, small cohorts are actually better off than large
cohorts even in a defined benefits social security system. This is because
small cohorts enjoy favorable wage and interest rate movements. Benefit
39cuts and/or pre-funding in response to an unexpected decline in the birth
rate would be inefficient.
The efficient responses to changes in life-expectancy depend
significantly on the type of change. If individuals know that the will live
longer or if fair annuities are available to diversify the risk of
unexpected deaths, a longer life-expectancy should trigger an increase in
retirement benefits to those who live longer, but a benefit reduction to
the previous cohort. Reduced benefits to those who expect to live longer
are efficient only if increased old-age survival leads to reduced
accidental bequests to the next generation.
Overall, the efficiency analysis yields policy conclusions that
differ significantly from the proposals in the current reform debate.
Notably, the efficient response to a baby boom is to increase the
retirement benefits of the baby boomers, even at the cost of tax increases
to the baby bust generation; and the efficient response to news about
increased future life-expectancy is to cut benefits to current retirees.
With regard to birth rate shocks, I obtain conclusions that differ
from the conventional wisdom, because my analysis includes endogenous
factor price movements. Factor price effect are largely ignored in the
current policy debate. The Social Security Administration, for example,
makes long run projections of future wages and interest rates by
extrapolating past trends. The analysis of this paper suggests that the
omission of endogenous factor price movements is seriously misleading under
empirically realistic parametric assumptions.
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42Table 1: Macroeconomic Dynamics with Defined-Benefits




Panel A. Shocks to the current workforce, m1t and bt-1:
Retirees:  pc2m1 = pc2b1 = g c2nw > 0  0.436
Workers:
 pc1m1 = pc1b1 = -Dc×[a-
q
1-q]









Panel B. Shocks to the current birthrate, bt:
Retirees:  pc2b = 0 0
Workers:  pc1b = (1-Dc×(c1/A)/y1)×(g c2nw-pRk/h+g r/h)  0.080
Investment:  pkb = -Dk×(c1/A)/y1×[g c2nw-pRk/h+g r/h] -0.240
Panel C. Shocks to the current length of life, fut and fet-1:
Retirees:  pc2fu = pc2fe1 = -g c2f < 0 -0.769
Workers:









Panel D. Shocks to life expectancy (future length of life), fet:
Retirees:  pc2fe = 0 0
Workers:  pc1fe = -(1-Dc×(c1/A)/y1)×gc2f<0 -0.288
Investment:  pkfe = Dk×(c1/A)/y1×gc2f >0  0.865
Panel E. Changes in lagged capital and productivity, kt-1 and at:
Retirees:  pc2k = -pc2a = g c2k >0 0.333
Workers:  pc1k = -pc1a = Dc×a >0 0.278
Investment:  pkk = -pka = Dk×a >0 0.500Notes to Table 1:
1. The impact on retirees, on workers, and on investment refers to the





kt. Since these variables are scaled by the
productivity trend At, the coefficients for productivity shocks at are
negative. The impact of productivity shocks on consumption and investment
levels, 1+pc2a>0, 1+pc1a>0, and 1+pka>0, are nonetheless positive.
2. The last column refers to the elasticity values in the numerical example
described in the text.
3. Variables without time subscripts refer to the steady state. The symbols




 Î(0,1), share of old capital in retiree income.
g c2k = (1-d*)×a+d* Î(0,1), impact of a higher capital-labor ratio on the old.




 Î(0,1), impact of a
higher current labor force on the old.
g c2f = 1 - (1-d*)×
q×(1-a)
a+q×(1-a) Î(0,1), impact (absolute value) of a longer life
span on the old.
pRk = (1-d/Rk)×(1-a) Î(0,1), impact (absolute value) of a higher capital-
labor ratio on the return to capital.
y1 = w/A×(1-q), income of the young scaled by productivity.
Dc = 
[g c2k+pRk/h]
(c1/A)/y1×[g c2k+pRk/h+g c2b×pbk] + k/y1 >0, marginal effect on consumption
when the income of the young rises.
Dk = 
1
(c1/A)/y1×[g c2k+pRk/h+g c2b×pbk] + k/y1 >0, marginal effect on capital
investment when the income of the young rises.Table 2: Dynamics with variable Social Security Benefits
Impact on Elasticity Coefficients
Panel A. Shocks to the current workforce, m1t and bt-1:
  Retirees:  pc2m1 = g c2nw + g c2b×pbm1, pc2b1 = g c2nw + g c2b×pbb1


















Panel B. Shocks to the current birthrate, bt:
  Retirees:  pc2b = g c2b×pbb
  Workers:  pc1b = (1-Dc×(c1/A)/y1)×[g c2nw-(1-d/Rk)×(1-a)/h+g r/h]
- Dc×
q
1-q ×pbb + (1-Dc×(c1/A)/y1)×gc2b×pbb1
  Investment: pkb = -Dk×(c1/A)/y1×[g c2nw-(1-d/Rk)×(1-a)/h+g r/h]
- Dk×
q
1-q ×pbb - Dk×(c1/A)/y1×gc2b×pbb1
Panel C. Shocks to the current length of life, fut and fet-1:
  Retirees:  pc2fu = -g c2f + g c2b×pbfu, pc2fe1 = -g c2f + g c2b×pbb1


















Panel D. Shocks to current life-expectancy, fet:
  Retirees:  pc2fe = g c2b×pbfe
  Workers:  pc1fe = -(1-Dc×(c1/A)/y1)×(g c2f-g c2b×pbfe1) - Dc×
q
1-q ×pbfe
  Investment: pkfe = Dk×(c1/A)/y1×(g c2f-g c2b×pbfe1) - Dk×
q
1-q ×pbfe
Panel E. Changes in lagged capital and productivity, kt-1 and at:
  Retirees:  pc2k = g c2k + g c2b×pbk,  pc2a = -g c2k + g c2b×pba
  Workers:  pc1k = Dc×a - Dc×
q
1-q×pbk,  pc1a = Dc×a - Dc×
q
1-q×pba
  Investment: pkk =  Dk×a - Dk×
q
1-q ×pbk, pka = -Dk×a - Dk×
q
1-q ×pba
Notes: The notation is as in Table 1. In addition, define
g c2b = (1-d*)×
q×(1-a)
a+q×(1-a) >0.Table 3: Alternative Policies in the Numerical Example













Policy coefficient 0 1.0 N/A 0 0.5












Impact on Investment -0.235 -0.500 -0.500 -0.235 -0.368



















Policy coefficient 0 -1.0 N/A 0 -0.5












Impact on Investment -0.265  0.0  0.0 -0.265 -0.111
Notes: The notation is as in Tables 1-2.
For DB, DC and privatized social security, m1t & bt-1 and fut & fet-1,
respectively, have the same effects.
In the conditionally prefunded system, policy coefficients are generally in
the range pbb1Î(0,+1) and pbfe1Î(-1,0). For the numerical example, I use
+0.5 and -0.5, respectively.Table 4: Macroeconomic Dynamics without Annuities Markets
Impact on Elasticity Coefficients Numerical
Example
Panel A. Shocks to retiree survival without annuities, mu2t and me2t-1:
Retirees: pc2m2u = g c2b×pbm2u,   pc2m2e1 = g c2b×pbm2e1
































Panel B. Shocks to future retiree survival without annuities, me2t:
Retirees: pc2m2e = g c2b×pbm2e 0
Workers: pc1m2e = -(1-Dc×(c1/A)/y1)×(1/h-g c2b·pbm2e1)




Investment: pkm2e = Dk·(c1/A)/y1×(1/h-g c2b·pbm2e1)




Panel C. Shocks to the current workforce, m1t and bt-1:*
  Retirees: pc2m1 = g c2nw + g c2b×pbm1,  pc2b1 = g c2nw + g c2b×pbb1
   where g c2nw = (1-d*)·(1-a - 
q/m2·(1-a)
a+q/m2·(1-a)) > 0



















1-q ×pbb1Table 4 (continued):
Panel D. Shocks to the current length of life, fut and fet-1:*
  Retirees:  pc2fu = -g c2f + g c2b×pbfu,  pc2fe1 = -g c2f + g c2b×pbb1
where g c2f = 1-(1-d*)·
q/m2·(1-a)
a+q/m2·(1-a) > 0
  Workers:  pc1fu = -D*c·
q
1-q·(pbfu+1), pc1fe1 = -D*c·
q
1-q·(pbfe1+1)
  Investment:  pkfu = -D*k·
q
1-q·(pbfu+1),  pkfe1 = -D*k·
q
1-q·(pbfe1+1)
Panel E. Shocks to the current birthrate, bt:*
  Retirees : pc2b = g c2b×pbb
  Workers:   pc1b = (1-Dc×(c1/A)/y1)×[g c2nw-pRk/h+g r/h+g c2b×pbb1]-Dc*×
q
1-q×pbb
  Investment: pkb = -Dk×(c1/A)/y1×[g c2nw-pRk/h+g r/h+g c2b×pbb1] - D*k×
q
1-q×pbb
Panel F. Shocks to the future length of life, fet:*
  Retirees:  pc2fe = g c2b×pbfe
  Workers:  pc1fe = -(1-Dc×(c1/A)/y1)×(g c2f-g c2b·pbfe1) - Dc*×
q
1-q×pbfe
  Investment: pkfe = Dk·(c1/A)/y1×(g c2f-g c2b·pbfe1) - D*k·
q
1-q·pbfe
Panel G. Changes in lagged capital and productivity, kt-1 and at:*
  Retirees  pc2k = g c2k + g c2b×pbk, pc2a = -g c2k + g c2b×pba













1. The notation is as in Tables 1-2, except for the following symbols:
q = Q1/(w×(1-q)+Q1) = share of bequests in worker’s income;
Dc*=Dc×(1-q), Dk*=Dk×(1-q).
* As in Table 2, but with modified coefficients if q¹0 or m2¹0.Table 5: Optimal Policy Responses to Demographic Shocks
Policy response to changes in the current workforce:
p*bm1 = p*bb1 = - 
g c2nw+Dc×q×pRk + D*c×[a-q/(1-q)]
g c2b+D*c×q/(1-q)









Policy response to changes in the current length of life:
p*bfu = p*bfe1 = 
g c2f-D*c×q/(1-q)
g c2b+D*c×q/(1-q)
Policy response to changes in current retiree survival without annuities:
p*bm2u = p*bm2e1 = - 
Dc×[1-q+q·m2/(1-m2)]×q/(1-q)
g c2b+D*c×q/(1-q)
Policy response to changes in the future length of life:
p*bfe = -(1-Dc×(c1/A)
y1 ) × 
g c2f-g c2b×pbfe1
g c2b+D*c×q/(1-q)
Policy response to changes in future retiree survival without annuities:
  p*bm2e = -(1-Dc×(c1/A)
y1 ) × 
1/h-g c2b×pbm2e1
g c2b+D*c×q/(1-q)
Note: The notation is as in Tables 1-2 and 4. The stars (*) denote
efficient values.Table 6: Macroeconomic Dynamics with CES-Production
Impact on Elasticity Coefficients
Panel A. Shocks to the current workforce, m1t and bt-1:
  Retirees:  pc2m1 = g c2nw + g c2b×pbm1, pc2b1 = g c2nw + g c2b×pbb1
























Panel B. Changes in lagged capital and productivity, kt-1 and at:
  Retirees:  pc2k = g c2k + g c2b×pbk, pc2a = -g c2k + g c2b×pba
  Workers:  pc1k = Dc×a/j-Dc×
q
1-q×pbk, pc1a = -Dc×a/j - Dc×
q
1-q×pba
  Investment: pkk =  Dk×a/j-Dk×
q








 = average capital share
b* = b×(w/A)
(c2/A)
/(1-d*) = share of old income that is wage-indexed
g c2k = (1-d*)×[a+(1-a-b*)×(j-1)/j] + d*




2. For the impact of shocks not listed here, the formulas in Table 2 apply









t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6
Generation i Consumption when Young (Period i)
Generation i Consumption when Old (Period i+1)
Notes: The bars show the percentage deviations of consumption from the
steady state in response to a one-time, 20% reduction in the birth rate in
period t, applied to the parameter values of the numerical example with
defined benefits social security system.
The responses are collected by generation, not by period. The responses
under generation i=t+2 refer, e.g., to the changes in c1t+2 (generation t+2










t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7
Notes: The bars show the percentage deviations of the capital labor ratio
kt from its steady state in response to a one-time, 20% reduction in the
birth rate at in period t, applied to the parameter values of the numerical
example with defined benefits social security system.